| 29. QUOD EIUS LOCUTIO IDIPSUM SIT QUOD IPSE, NEC TAMEN SINT DUO SED UNUS SPIRITUS.
| 29. This Spirit's Expression is the very same thing as this Spirit. Nevertheless, there are not two spirits but [only] one.
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| Iam vero iis quae de proprietatibus huius summae naturae ad praesens mihi ducem rationem sequenti occurrerunt perspectis, opportunum existimo, ut de eius locutione, per quam facta sunt omnia, si quid possum considerem.
| But now, having considered these questions regarding the properties of the supreme Nature, which have occurred to me in following the guidance of reason to the present point, I think it reasonable to examine this Spirit’s expression (locutio), through which all things were created.
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| Etenim cum omnia quae de illa supra potui animadvertere, rationis robur inflexibile teneant, illud me maxime cogit de illa diligentius discutere, quia idipsum quod ipse summus spiritus est probatur esse. Si enim ille nihil fecit nisi per seipsum, et quidquid ab eo factum est per illam est factum: quomodo illa est aliud quam quod est idem ipse?
| For, though all that has been ascertained regarding this expression above has the inflexible strength of reason, I am especially compelled to a more careful discussion of this expression by the fact that it is proved to be identical with the supreme Spirit himself. For, if this Spirit created nothing except through himself, and whatever was created by him was created through that expression, how shall that expression be anything else than what the Spirit himself is?
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| Amplius. Asserunt utique inexpugnabiliter ea quae iam inventa sunt, quia nihil omnino potuit umquam aut potest subsistere praeter creantem spiritum et eius creaturam. Hanc vero spiritus eiusdem locutionem impossibile est inter creata contineri, quoniam quidquid creatum subsistit per illam factum est, illa vero per se fieri non potuit. Nihil quippe per seipsum fieri potest, quia quidquid fit, posterius est eo per quod fit, et nihil est posterius seipso.
| Furthermore, the facts already discovered declare irrefutably that nothing at all ever could, or can, exist, except the creative Spirit and its creatures. But it is impossible that the expression of this Spirit is included among created beings; for every created being was created through that expression; but that expression could not be created through itself. For nothing can be created through itself, since every creature exists later than that through which it is created, and nothing exists later than itself.
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| Relinquitur itaque ut haec summi spiritus locutio, cum creatura esse non possit, non sit aliud quam summus spiritus. Denique haec ipsa locutio nihil aliud potest intelligi quam eiusdem spiritus intelligentia, qua cuncta intelligit. Quid enim est aliud illi rem loqui aliquam hoc loquendi modo quam intelligere? Nam non ut homo non semper dicit quod intelligit.
| The alternative remaining is, then, that this expression of the supreme Spirit, since it cannot be a creature, is no other than the supreme Spirit. Therefore, this expression itself can be conceived of as nothing else than the intelligence (intelligentia) of this Spirit, by which he conceives of (intelligit) all things. For, to him, what is expressing anything, according to this kind of expression, but conceiving of it? For he does not, like man, ever fail to express what he conceives.
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| Si igitur summe simplex natura non est aliud quam quod est sua intelligentia, /48/ quemadmodum est idem quod est sua sapientia: necesse est ut similiter non sit aliud quam quod est sua locutio. Sed quoniam iam manifestum est summum spiritum unum tantum esse et omnimode individuum: necesse est ut sic illi haec sua locutio sit consubstantialis, ut non sint duo sed unus spiritus.
| If, then, the supremely simple Nature is nothing else than what its intelligence is, just as it is identical with its wisdom, necessarily, in the same way, it is nothing else than what its expression is. But, since it is already manifest that the supreme Spirit is one only, and altogether indivisible, this his expression must be so consubstantial with him, that they are not two spirits, but one.
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| 30. QUOD EADEM LOCUTIO NON CONSTET PLURIBUS VERBIS SED SIT UNUM VERBUM.
| 30. This Expression is not many words but is one word.
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| Cur igitur dubitem quod supra dubium dimiseram, scilicet utrum haec locutio in pluribus verbis an in uno verbo consistat? Nam si sic est summae naturae consubstantialis, ut non sint duo sed unus spiritus: utique sicut illa summe simplex est, ita et ista. Non igitur constat pluribus verbis sed est unum verbum per quod facta sunt omnia.
| Why, then, should I have any further doubt regarding that question which I dismissed above as doubtful, namely, whether this expression consists of more words than one, or of one? For, if it is so consubstantial with the supreme Nature that they are not two spirits, but one; assuredly, just as the latter is supremely simple, so is the former. It therefore does not consist of more words than one, but is one Word, through which all things were created.
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| 31. QUOD IPSUM VERBUM NON SIT SIMILITUDO FACTORUM SED VERITAS ESSENTIAE, FACTA vero SINT ALIQUA VERITATIS IMITATIO; ET QUAE NATURAE MAGIS SINT QUAM ALIAE ET PRAESTANTIORES.
| 31. This Word is not the likeness of created things but is true Existence. Created things are a likeness of this true Existence. Which natures exist more, and are more excellent, than others.
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| Sed ecce videtur mihi suboriri nec facilis nec ullatenus sub ambiguitate relinquenda quaestio. Etenim omnia huiusmodi verba quibus res quaslibet mente dicimus, id est cogitamus: similitudines et imagines sunt rerum quarum verba sunt; et omnis similitudo vel imago tanto magis vel minus est vera, quanto magis vel minus imitatur rem cuius est similitudo.
| But here, it seems to me, there arises a question that is not easy to answer, and yet must not be left in any ambiguity. For all words of that sort by which we express any objects in our mind, that is, conceive of them, are likenesses and images of the objects to which they correspond; and every likeness or image is more or less true, according as it more or less closely imitates the object of which it is the likeness.
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| Quid igitur tenendum est de verbo, quo dicuntur et per quod facta sunt omnia? Erit aut non erit similitudo eorum, quae per ipsum facta sunt? Si enim ipsum est vera mutabilium similitudo, non est consubstantiale summae incommutabilitati; quod falsum est. Si autem non omnino vera sed qualiscumque similitudo mutabilium est, non est verbum summae veritatis omnino verum; quod absurdum est. At si nullam mutabilium habet similitudinem: quomodo ad exemplum illius facta sunt? /49/
| What, then, is to be our position regarding the Word by which all things are expressed, and through which all were created? Will it be, or will it not be, the likeness of the things that have been created through itself? For, if it is itself the true likeness of mutable things, it is not consubstantial with supreme immutability; which is false. But, if it is not altogether true, and is merely a sort of likeness of mutable things, then the Word of supreme Truth is not altogether true; which is absurd. But if it has no likeness to mutable things, how were they created after its example?
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| Verum forsitan nihil huius remanebit ambiguitatis, si quemadmodum in vivo homine veritas hominis esse dicitur, in picto vero similitudo sive imago illius veritatis: sic existendi veritas intelligatur in verbo cuius essentia sic summe est, ut quodam modo illa sola sit; in iis vero quae in eius comparatione quodam modo non sunt, et tamen per illud et secundum illud facta sunt aliquid, imitatio aliqua summae illius essentiae perpendatur.
| But perhaps nothing of this ambiguity will remain if—as the reality of a man is said to be the living man, but the likeness or image of a man in his picture—so the reality of being is conceived of as in the Word, whose essence exists so supremely that in a certain sense it alone exists; while in these things which, in comparison with that Essence, are in some sort non-existent, and, yet were made something through, and according to, that Word, a kind of imitation of that supreme Essence is found.
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| Sic quippe verbum summae veritatis, quod et ipsum est summa veritas, nullum augmentum vel detrimentum sentiet secundum hoc quod magis vel minus creaturis sit simile; sed potius necesse erit omne quod creatum est tanto magis esse et tanto esse praestantius, quanto similius est illi quod summe est et summe magnum est.
| For, in this way the Word of supreme Truth, which is also itself supreme Truth, will experience neither gain nor loss, according as it is more or less like its creatures. But the necessary inference will rather be, that every created being exists in so much the greater degree, or is so much the more excellent, the more like it is to what exists supremely, and is supremely great.
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| Hinc etenim fortasse, immo non fortasse sed pro certo, hinc omnis intellectus iudicat naturas quolibet modo viventes praestare non viventibus, sentientes non sentientibus, rationales irrationalibus. Quoniam enim summa natura suo quodam singulari modo non solum est sed et vivit et sentit et rationalis est, liquet quoniam omnium quae sunt, id quod aliquomodo vivit, magis est illi simile quam id quod nullatenus vivit; et quod modo quolibet vel corporeo sensu cognoscit aliquid, magis quam quod nihil omnino sentit; et quod rationale est, magis quam quod rationis capax non est.
| For on this account, perhaps,—nay, not perhaps, but certainly,—does every mind judge natures in any way alive to excel those that are not alive, the sentient to excel the non-sentient, the rational the irrational. For, since the supreme Nature, after a certain unique manner of its own, not only exists, but lives, and is sentient and rational, it is clear that, of all existing beings, that which is in some way alive is more like this supreme Nature, than that which is not alive at all; and what, in any way, even by a corporeal sense, cognises anything, is more like this Nature than what is not sentient at all; and what is rational, more than what is incapable of reasoning.
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| Quoniam vero simili ratione quaedam naturae magis minusue sint quam aliae, perspicuum est. Quemadmodum enim illud natura praestantius est, quod per naturalem essentiam propinquius est praestantissimo: ita utique illa natura magis est, cuius essentia similior est summae essentiae.
| But it is clear, for a like reason, that certain natures exist in a greater or less degree than others. For, just as that is more excellent by nature which, through its natural essence, is nearer to the most excellent Being, so certainly that nature exists in a greater degree, whose essence is more like the supreme Essence.
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| Quod sic quoque facile animadverti posse existimo. Nempe si cuilibet substantiae, quae et vivit et sensibilis et rationalis est, cogitatione auferatur quod rationalis est, deinde quod sensibilis, et postea quod vitalis, postremo ipsum nudum esse quod remanet: quis non intelligat quod illa substantia quae sic paulatim destruitur, ad minus et minus esse, et ad ultimum ad /50/ non esse gradatim perducitur? Quae autem singulatim absumpta quamlibet essentiam ad minus et minus esse deducunt, eadem ordinatim assumpta illam ad magis et magis esse perducunt.
| And I think that this can easily be ascertained as follows. If we should conceive any substance that is alive, and sentient, and rational, to be deprived of its reason, then of its sentience, then of its life, and finally of the bare existence that remains, who would fail to understand that the substance that is thus destroyed, little by little, is gradually brought to smaller and smaller degrees of existence, and at last to non-existence? But the attributes which, taken each by itself, reduce an essence to less and less degrees of existence, if assumed in order, lead it to greater and greater degrees.
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| Patet igitur quia magis est vivens substantia quam non vivens, et sensibilis quam non sensibilis, et rationalis quam non rationalis. Non est itaque dubium quod omnis essentia eo ipso magis est et praestantior est, quo similior est illi essentiae, quae summe est et summe praestat.
| It is evident, then, that a living substance exists in a greater degree than one that is not living, a sentient than a non-sentient, and a rational than a non-rational. So, there is no doubt that every substance exists in a greater degree, and is more excellent, according as it is more like that substance which exists supremely and is supremely excellent.
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| Satis itaque manifestum est in verbo, per quod facta sunt omnia, non esse ipsorum similitudinem sed veram simplicemque essentiam; in factis vero non esse simplicem absolutamque essentiam sed verae illius essentiae vix aliquam imitationem. Unde necesse est non idem verbum secundum rerum creatarum similitudinem magis vel minus esse verum sed omnem creatam naturam eo altiori gradu essentiae dignitatisque consistere, quo magis illi propinquare uidetur.
| It is sufficiently clear, then, that in the Word, through which all things were created, is not their likeness, but their true and simple essence; while, in the things created, there is not a simple and absolute essence, but an imperfect imitation of that true Essence. Hence, it necessarily follows, that this Word is not more nor less true, according to its likeness to the things created, but every created nature has a higher essence and dignity, the more it is seen to approach that Word.
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| 32. QUOD SUMMUS SPIRITUS SEIPSUM DICAT COAETERNO VERBO.
| 32. The Supreme Spirit speaks of itself by means of a co-eternal Word.
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| Sed cum ita sit: quomodo illud quod simplex est veritas, potest esse verbum eorum quorum non est similitudo, cum omne verbum quo aliqua res sic mente dicitur, similitudo sit rei eiusdem? Et si non est verbum eorum quae facta sunt per ipsum: quomodo constabit quia sit verbum? Nempe omne verbum alicuius rei verbum est. Denique, si numquam creatura esset, nullum eius esset verbum.
| But since this is true, how can what is simple Truth be the Word corresponding to those objects, of which it is not the likeness? Since every word by which an object is thus mentally expressed is the likeness of that object, if this is not the word corresponding to the objects that have been created through it, how shall we be sure that it is the Word? For every word is a word corresponding to some object. Therefore, if there were no creature, there would be no word.
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| Quid igitur? An concludendum est quia, si nullo modo esset creatura, nequaquam esset verbum illud, quod est summa et nullius indigens essentia? Aut fortasse ipsa summa essentia quae verbum est, essentia quidem esset aeterna sed verbum non esset, si nihil umquam per illam fieret? Eius enim quod nec fuit nec est nec futurum est, nullum verbum esse potest.
| Are we to conclude, then, that if there were no creature, that Word would not exist at all, which is the supreme self-sufficient Essence? Or, would the supreme Being itself, perhaps, which is the Word still be the eternal Being, but not the Word, if nothing were ever created through that Being? For, to what has not been, and is not, and will not be, then can be no word corresponding.
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| Verum secundum hanc rationem, si numquam ulla praeter summum spiritum esset essentia, nullum omnino esset in illo verbum. Si nullum in illo verbum esset, nihil apud se diceret. Si nihil apud se diceret: cum /51/ idem sit illi sic dicere aliquid quod est intelligere, non aliquid intelligeret. Si nihil intelligeret: ergo summa sapientia, quae non est aliud quam idem spiritus, nihil intelligeret; quod absurdissimum est.
| But, according to this reasoning, if there were never any being but the supreme Spirit, there would be no word at all in him. If there were no word in him, he would express nothing to himself; if he expressed nothing to himself, since, for him, expressing anything is the same with understanding or conceiving of it (intelligere), he would not understand or conceive of anything; if he understood or conceived of nothing, then the supreme Wisdom, which is nothing else than this Spirit, would understand or conceive of nothing; which is most absurd.
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| Quid ergo? Si enim nihil intelligeret: quomodo esset summa sapientia? Aut si nullo modo aliquid esset praeter illam: quid illa intelligeret? Sed numquid seipsam non intelligeret?
| What is to be inferred? For, if it conceived of nothing, how would it be the supreme Wisdom? Or, if there were in no wise anything but it, of what would it conceive? Would it not conceive of itself?
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| At quomodo vel cogitari potest quod summa sapientia se aliquando non intelligat, cum rat ionalis m ens possit non solum suimet sed et ipsius summae sapientiae reminisci, et illam et se intelligere? Si enim mens humana nullam eius aut suam habere memoriam aut intelligentiam posset, nequaquam se ab irrationalibus creaturis et illam ab omni creatura, secum soia tacite disputando, sicut nunc mens mea facit, discerneret.
| But how can it be even imagined that the supreme Wisdom, at any time does not conceive of itself; since a rational mind can remember not only itself, but that supreme Wisdom, and conceive of that Wisdom and of itself? For, if the human mind could have no memory or concept of that Wisdom or of itself, it would not distinguish itself at all from irrational creatures, and that Wisdom from the whole created world, in silent meditation by itself, as my mind does now.
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| Ergo summus ille spiritus sicut est aeternus, ita aeterne sui memor est et intelligit se ad similitudinem mentis rationalis; immo non ad ullius similitudinem sed ille principaliter et mens rationalis ad eius similitudinem. At si aeterne se intelligit, aeterne se dicit. Si aeterne se dicit, aeterne est verbum eius apud ipsum. Sive igitur ille cogitetur nulla alia existente essentia, sive aliis existentibus: necesse est verbum illius coaeternum illi esse cum illo.
| Hence, that Spirit, supreme as he is eternal, is thus eternally mindful of himself, and conceives of himself after the likeness of a rational mind; nay, not after the likeness of anything; but in the first place that Spirit, and the rational mind after its likeness. But, if he conceives of himself eternally, he expresses himself eternally. If he expresses himself eternally, his Word is eternally with him. Whether, therefore, it be thought of in connection with no other existing being, or with other existing beings, the Word of that Spirit must be coeternal with him.
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| 33. QUOD UNO VERBO DICAT SE ET QUOD FECIT.
| 33. By means of one Word [the Supreme Spirit] speaks both of itself and of that which it has made.
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| Sed ecce quaerenti mihi de verbo quo creator dicit omnia quae fecit, obtulit se verbum quo seipsum dicit, qui omnia fecit. An ergo alio verbo dicit se ipsum, et alio ea quae facit; aut potius eodem ipso verbo quo dicit se ipsum, dicit quaecumque facit?
| But here, in my inquiry concerning the Word, by which the Creator expresses all that he creates, is suggested the word by which he, who creates all, expresses himself. Does he express himself, then, by one word, and what he creates by another; or does he rather express whatever he creates by the same word whereby he expresses himself?
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| Nam hoc quoque verbum quo se ipsum dicit, necesse est idipsum esse quod ipse est, sicut constat de /52/ verbo illo, quo dicit ea quae a se facta sunt. Cum enim, etiam si nihil umquam aliud esset nisi summus ille spiritus, ratio tamen cogat verbum illud quo se dicit ex necessitate esse: quid verius, quam hoc verbum eius non esse aliud, quam quod ipse est? Ergo si et se ipsum et ea quae facit consubstantiali sibi verbo dicit: manifestum est quia verbi quo se dicit, et verbi quo creaturam dicit, una substantia est. Quomodo ergo, si una substantia est, duo verba sunt?
| For this Word also, by which he expresses himself, must be identical with himself, as is evidently true of the Word by which he expresses his creatures. For since, even if nothing but that supreme Spirit ever existed, urgent reason would still require the existence of that word by which he expresses himself, what is more true than that his Word is nothing else than what he himself is? Therefore, if he expresses himself and what he creates, by a Word consubstantial with himself, it is manifest that of the Word by which he expresses himself, and of the Word by which he expresses the created world, the substance is one. How, then, if the substance is one, are there two words?
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| Sed forsitan non cogit identitas substantiae verbi unitatem admittere. Nam idem ipse qui his verbis loquitur, eandem illis habet substantiam, et tamen verbum non est. Sed utique verbum quo se dicit summa sapientia, convenientissime dici potest verbum eius secundum superiorem rationem, quia eius perfectam tenet similitudinem.
| But, perhaps, identity of substance does not compel us to admit a single Word. For the Creator himself, who speaks in these words, has the same substance with them, and yet is not the Word. But, undoubtedly the word by which the supreme Wisdom expresses itself may most fitly be called its Word on the former ground, namely, that it contains the perfect likeness of that Wisdom.
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| Nam nulla ratione negari potest, cum mens rationalis seipsam cogitando intelligit, imaginem ipsius nasci in sua cogitatione; immo ipsam cogitationem sui esse suam imaginem ad eius similitudinem tamquam ex eius impressione formatam. Quamcumque enim rem mens seu per corporis imaginationem seu per rationem cupit veraciter cogitare, eius utique similitudinem quantum valet in ipsa sua cogitatione conatur exprimere. Quod quanto verius facit, tanto verius rem ipsam cogitat. Et hoc quidem, cum cogitat aliquid aliud quod ipsa non est, et maxime cum aliquod cogitat corpus, clarius perspicitur. Cum enim cogito notum mihi hominem absentem, formatur acies cogitationis meae in talem imaginem eius, qualem illam per visum oculorum in memoriam attraxi. Quae imago in cogitatione verbum est eiusdem hominis, quem cogitando dico.
| For, on no ground can it be denied that when a rational mind conceives of itself in meditation the image of itself arises in its thought, or rather the thought of the mind is itself its image, after its likeness, as if formed from its impression. For, whatever object the mind, either through representation of the body or through reason, desires to conceive of truly, it at least attempts to express its likeness, so far as it is able, in the mental concept itself. And the more truly it succeeds in this, the more truly does it think of the object itself; and, indeed, this fact is observed more clearly when it thinks of something else which it is not, and especially when it thinks of a material body. For, when I think of a man I know, in his absence, the vision of my thought forms such an image as I have acquired in memory through my ocular vision and this image is the word corresponding to the man I express by thinking of him.
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| Habet igitur mens rationalis, cum se cogitando intelligit, secum imaginem suam ex se natam, id est cogitationem sui ad suam similitudinem quasi sua impressione formatam; quamvis ipsa se a sua imagine non nisi ratione sola separare possit. Quae imago eius verbum eius est.
| The rational mind, then, when it conceives of itself in thought, has with itself its image born of itself that is, its thought in its likeness, as if formed from its impression, although it cannot, except in thought alone, separate itself from its image, which image is its word.
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| Hoc itaque modo quis neget summam sapientiam, cum se dicendo /53/ intelligit, gignere consubstantialem sibi similitudinem suam, id est verbum suum? Quod verbum, licet de re tam singulariter eminenti proprie aliquid satis convenienter dici non possit, non tamen inconvenienter sicut similitudo ita et imago et figura et caracter eius dici potest.
| Who, then, can deny that the supreme Wisdom, when it conceives of itself by expressing itself, begets a likeness of itself consubstantial with it, namely, its Word? And this Word, although of a subject so uniquely important nothing can be said with sufficient propriety, may still not inappropriately be called the image of that Wisdom, its representation, just as it is called his likeness.
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| Verbum autem quo creaturam dicit, nequaquam similiter est verbum creaturae, quia non est eius similitudo sed principalis essentia. Consequitur igitur, ut ipsam creaturam non dicat verbo creaturae. Cuius ergo verbo eam dicit, si non eam dicit verbo eius? Nam quod dicit, verbo dicit, et verbum alicuius est verbum, id est similitudo. Sed si nihil aliud dicit quam se aut creaturam, nihil dicere potest nisi aut suo aut eius verbo.
| But the Word by which the Creator expresses the created world is not at all, in the same way, a word corresponding to the created world, since it is not this world’s likeness, but its elementary essence. It therefore follows, that he does not express the created world itself by a word corresponding to the created world. To what, then, does the word belong, whereby he expresses it, if he does not express it by a word, belonging to itself? For what he expresses, he expresses by a word, and a word must belong to something, that is, it is the likeness of something. But if he expresses nothing but himself or his created world he can express nothing, except by a word corresponding to himself or to something else.
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| Si ergo nihil dicit verbo creaturae: quidquid dicit, verbo suo dicit. Uno igitur eodemque verbo dicit seipsum et quaecumque fecit.
| So, if he expresses nothing by a word belonging to the created world, whatever he expresses, he expresses by the Word corresponding to himself. By one and the same Word, then, he expresses himself and whatever he has made.
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| 34. QUOMODO SUO VERBO VIDERI POSSIT DICERE CREATURAM.
| 34. How [the Supreme Spirit] can be seen to speak of creatures by its own Word.
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| Sed quomodo tam differentes res, scilicet creans et creata essentia, dici possunt uno verbo, praesertim cum verbum ipsum sit dicenti coaeternum, creatura autem non sit illi coaeterna? Forsitan quia ipse est summa sapientia et summa ratio, in qua sunt omnia quae facta sunt -- quemadmodum opus quod fit secundum aliquam artem, non solum quando fit, verum et antequam fiat et postquam dissolvitur, semper est in ipsa arte non aliud quam quod est ars ipsa --:
| But how can objects so different as the creative and the created being be expressed by one Word, especially since that Word itself is coeternal with him who expresses them, while the created world is not coeternal with him? Perhaps, because he himself is supreme Wisdom and supreme Reason, in which are all things that have been created; just as a work which is made after one of the arts, not only when it is made, but before it is made, and after it is destroyed, is always in respect of the art itself nothing else than what that art is.
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| idcirco cum ipse summus spiritus dicit seipsum, dicit omnia quae facta sunt. Nam et antequam fierent, et cum iam facta sunt, et cum corrumpuntur seu aliquo modo uariantur: semper in ipso sunt, non quod sunt in seipsis sed quod est idem ipse. Etenim in seipsis sunt essentia mutabilis secundum immutabilem rationem creata; in ipso vero sunt ipsa prima essentia et prima existendi veritas, /54/ cui prout magis utcumque illa similia sunt, ita verius et praestantius existunt. Hoc itaque modo non irrationabiliter asseri potest, quia cum seipsum dicit summus ille spiritus, dicit etiam quidquid factum est uno eodemque verbo.
| Hence, when the supreme Spirit expresses himself, he expresses all created beings. For, both before they were created, and now that they have been created, and after they are decayed or changed in any way, they are ever in him not what they are in themselves, but what this Spirit himself is. For, in themselves they are mutable beings, created according to immutable reason; while in him is the true first being, and the first reality of existence, the more like unto which those beings are in any way, the more really and excellently do they exist. Thus, it may reasonably be declared that, when the supreme Spirit expresses himself, he also expresses whatever has been created by one and the same Word.
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| 35. QUOD, QUIDQUID FACTUM EST, IN EIUS VERBO ET SCIENTIA SIT VITA ET VERITAS.
| 35. Whatever was made exists as life and truth in the Word and Knowledge of the Supreme Spirit.
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| Verum cum constet quia verbum eius consubstantiale illi est et perfecte simile, necessario consequitur, ut omnia quae sunt in illo, eadem et eodem modo sint in verbo eIus. Quidquid igitur factum est sive vivat sive non vivat, aut quomodocumque sit in se: in illo est ipsa vita et veritas.
| But, since it is established that his word is consubstantial with him, and perfectly like him, it necessarily follows that all things that exist in him exist also, and in the same way, in his Word. Whatever has been created, then, whether alive or not alive, or howsoever it exists in itself, is very life and truth in him.
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| Quoniam autem idem est summo spiritui scire quod intelligere sive dicere, necesse est ut eodem modo sciat omnia quae scit, quo ea dicit aut intelligit. Quemadmodum igitur sunt in verbo eius omnia vita et veritas, ita sunt in scientia eius.
| But, since knowing is the same to the supreme Spirit as conceiving or expressing, he must know all things that he knows in the same way in which he expresses or conceives of them. Therefore, just as all things are in his Word life and truth, so are they in his knowledge.
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| 36. QUAM INCOMPREHENSIBILI MODO DICAT vel SCIAT RES A SE FACTAS.
| 36. In what an incomprehensible manner [the Supreme Spirit] speaks of, or knows, the things made by it.
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| Qua ex re manifestissime comprehendi potest, quomodo dicat idem spiritus vel quomodo sciat ea quae facta sunt, ab humana scientia comprehendi non posse. Nam nulli dubium creatas substantias multo aliter esse in seipsis quam in nostra scientia. In seipsis namque sunt per /55/ ipsam suam essentiam; in nostra vero scientia non sunt earum essentiae sed earum similitudines.
| Hence, it may be most clearly comprehended that how this Spirit expresses, or how he knows the created world, cannot be comprehended by human knowledge. For none can doubt that created substances exist far differently in themselves than in our knowledge. For, in themselves they exist by virtue of their own being; while in our knowledge is not their being, but their likeness.
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| Restat igitur ut tanto verius sint in seipsis quam in nostra scientia, quanto verius alicubi sunt per suam essentiam quam per suam similitudinem. Cum ergo et hoc constet, quia omnis creata substantia tanto verius est in verbo, id est in intelligentia creatoris, quam in seipsa, quanto verius existit creatrix quam creata essentia: quomodo comprehendat humana mens cuIusmodi sit illud dicere, et illa scientia, quae sic longe superior et verior est creatis substantiis, si nostra scientia tam longe superatur ab illis, quantum earum similitudo distat ab earum essentia?
| We conclude, then, that they exist more truly in themselves than in our knowledge, in the same degree in which they exist more truly anywhere by virtue of their own being, than by virtue of their likeness. Therefore, since this is also an established truth, that every created substance exists more truly in the Word, that is, in the intelligence of the Creator, than it does in itself, in the same degree in which the creative being exists more truly than the created; how can the human mind comprehend of what kind is that expression and that knowledge, which is so much higher and truer than created substances; if our knowledge is as far surpassed by those substances as their likeness is removed from their being?
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| 37. QUOD, QUIDQUID IPSE EST AD CREATURAM, HOC SIT ET VERBUM EIUS; NEC TAMEN AMBO SIMUL PLURALITER.
| 37. Whatever the Supreme Spirit is in relation to creatures this Spirit's Word also is. And yet, together they are not [this relation] in a plural way.
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| Verum cum manifeste rationes superiores doceant summum spiritum per verbum suum fecisse omnia: numquid non et ipsum verbum fecit eadem omnia? Quoniam enim illi est consubstantiale, cuius est verbum, necesse est ut sit summa essentia. Summa autem essentia non est nisi una, quae sola creatrix et solum principium est omnium quae facta sunt. Ipsa namque sola fecit non per aliud quam per se omnia ex nihilo. Quare quaecumque summus spiritus facit, eadem et verbum eius facit et similiter.
| But since it has already been clearly demonstrated that the supreme Spirit created all things through his Word, did not the Word itself also create all things? For, since it is consubstantial with him, it must be the supreme essence of that of which it is the Word. But there is no supreme Essence, except one, which is the only creator and the only beginning of all things which have been created. For this Essence, through no other than itself, alone created all things from nothing. Hence, whatever the supreme Spirit creates, the same his Word also creates, and in the same way.
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| Quidquid igitur summus spiritus est ad creaturam, hoc et verbum eius est et similiter; nec tamen ambo simul pluraliter, quia non sunt plures creatrices summae essentiee. Sicut igitur ille est creator rerum et principium, sic et verbum eius; nec tamen sunt duo sed unus creator et unum principium. /56/
| Whatever relation, then, the supreme Spirit bears to what he creates, this relation his Word also bears, and in the same way. And yet, both do not bear it simultaneously, as more than one, since there are not more supreme creative essences than one. Therefore, just as he is the creator and the beginning of the world, so is his Word also; and yet there are not two, but one creator and one beginning.
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| 38. QUOD DICI NON POSSIT, QUID DUO SINT, QUAMVIS NECESSE SIT ESSE DUOS.
| 38. It cannot be said what two they are, although they must be two.
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| Studiose itaque attendendum est quiddam, quod valde insolitum rebus aliis, in summo spiritu et verbo eIus videtur evenire. Nam certum est sic unicuique singulatim et utrisque simul inesse, quidquid sunt in essentia et quidquid sunt ad creaturam, ut et singulatim perfectum sit ambobus, et tamen pluralitatem non admittat in duobus. Licet enim singulatim et ille perfecte sit summa veritas et creator, et verbum eius sit summa veritas et creator: non tamen ambo simul sunt duae veritates aut duo creatores.
| Our careful attention is therefore demanded by a peculiarity which, though most unusual in other beings, seems to belong to the supreme Spirit and his Word. For, it is certain that in each of these separately and in both simultaneously, whatever they are so exists that it is separately perfected in both, and yet does not admit plurality in the two. For although, taken separately, he is perfectly supreme Truth and Creator, and his Word is supreme Truth and Creator; yet both at once are not two truths or two creators.
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| Sed cum haec ita sint, miro tamen modo apertissimum est, quia nec ille cuius est verbum, potest esse verbum suum, nec verbum potest esse ille cuius est verbum. Ut in eo quod significat vel quid sint substantialiter, vel quid sint ad creaturam, semper individuam teneant unitatem; in eo vero quod ille non est ex isto, hoc autem est ex illo, ineffabilem admittant pluralitatem. Ineffabilem certe. Quamvis enim necessitas cogat ut sint duo, nullo tamen modo exprimi potest, quid duo sint.
| But although this is true, yet it is most remarkably clear that neither he, whose is the Word, can be his own Word, nor can the Word be he, whose Word it is, although in so far as regards either what they are substantially, or what relation they bear to the created world, they ever preserve an indivisible unity. But in respect of the fact that he does not derive existence from that Word, but that Word from him, they admit an ineffable plurality, ineffable, certainly, for although necessity requires that they be two, it can in no wise be explained why they are two.
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| Nam etsi forte duo pares aut aliquid aliud similiter ad invicem possint dici: in his ipsis tamen relativis si quaeratur quid sit illud de quo dicuntur, non poterit dici pluraliter, quemadmodum dicuntur duae pares lineae aut duo similes homines. Quippe nec sunt duo pares spiritus nec duo pares creatores nec duo aliquid, quod significet eorun, aut essentiam aut habitudinem ad creaturam. Sed nec duo aliquid, quod designet propriam habitudinem alterius ad alterum; quia nec duo verba nec duae imagines.
| For although they may perhaps be called two equals, or some other mutual relation may in like manner be attributed to them, yet if it were to be asked what it is in these very relative expressions with reference to which they are used, it cannot be expressed plurally, as one speaks of two equal lines, or two like men. For, neither are there two equal spirits nor two equal creators, nor is there any dual expression which indicates either their essence or their relation to the created world; and there is no dual expression which designates the peculiar relation of the one to the other, since there are neither two words nor two images.
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| Verbum namque hoc ipsum quod verbum est aut imago, ad alterum est, quia non nisi alicuius verbum est aut imago; et sic propria sunt haec alterius, ut nequaquam alteri coaptentur. Nam ille cuius est verbum aut imago, nec imago nec verbum est. Constat igitur quia exprimi non potest, quid duo sint summus spiritus et verbum eius, quamvis quibusdam singulorum proprietatibus cogantur esse duo. Etenim proprium est unius esse ex altero, et proprium est alterius alterum esse ex illo. /57/
| For the Word, by virtue of the fact that it is a word or image, bears a relation to the other, because it is Word and image only as it is the Word and image of something; and so peculiar are these attributes to the one that they are by no means predicable of the other. For he, whose is the Word and image, is neither image nor Word. It is, therefore, evident that it cannot be explained why they are two, the supreme Spirit and the Word, although by certain properties of each they are required to be two. For it is the property of the one to derive existence from the other, and the property of that other that the first derives existence from him.
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| 39. QUOD IDEM VERBUM SIT A SUMMO SPIRITU NASCENDO.
| 39. This Word exists from the Supreme Spirit by being begotten.
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| Quod ipsum nullo utique verbo videtur familiarius posse proferri, quam si dicatur proprium esse unius nasci ex altero, et proprium alterius nasci alterum ex ipso. Certum namque iam constat, quia verbum summi spiritus non sic est ex eo, quemadmodum ea quae ab illo facta sunt sed quemadmodum creator de creatore, summum de summo, et ut plena brevitate omnimoda absolvatur similitudo: penitus idem ipsum est de eodem ipso, et ita ut nullatenus sit nisi ex eo.
| And this truth, it seems, can be expressed in no more familiar terms than when it is said to be the property of the one, to be born of the other; and of the other, that the first is born of him. For it is now clearly proved, that the Word of the supreme Spirit does not derive existence from him, as do those beings which have been created by him; but as Creator from Creator, supreme Being from supreme Being. And, to dispose of this comparison with all brevity, it is one and the same being which derives existence from one and the same being, and on such terms, that it in no wise derives existence, except from that being.
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| Cum igitur pateat verbum summi spiritus sic esse ex ipso solo, ut perfectam eius quasi proles parentis teneat similitudinem, nec sic esse ex ipso, ut fiat ab eo: profecto nullo modo convenientius cogitari potest esse ex illo quam nascendo.
| Since it is evident, then, that the Word of the supreme Spirit so derives existence from him alone, that it is completely analogous to the offspring of a parent; and that it does not derive existence from him, as if it were created by him, doubtless no more fitting supposition can be entertained regarding its origin, than that it derives existence from the supreme Spirit by birth (nascendo).
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| Nempe si innumerabiles res indubitanter dicuntur nasci ex iis ex quibus habent ut sint, cum nullam eorum de quibus nasci dicuntur, teneant similitudinem sicut proles parentis -- dicimus enim capillos nasci de capite et poma ex arbore, licet nec illi capitis nec ista arboris similia sint --;
| For, innumerable objects are unhesitatingly said to be born of those things from which they derive existence, although they possess no such likeness to those things of which they are said to be born, as offspring to a parent.—We say, for instance, that the hair is born of the head, or the fruit of the tree, although the hair does not resemble the head, nor the fruit the tree.
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| si inquam multa huiusmodi non absurde dicuntur nasci: tanto congruentius dici potest verbum summi spiritus ex illo existere nascendo, quanto perfectius quasi proles parentis trahit eius similitudinem ex illo existendo.
| If, then, many objects of this sort are without absurdity said to be born, so much the more fittingly may the Word of the supreme Spirit be said to derive existence from him by birth, the more perfect the resemblance it bears to him, like a child’s to its parent, through deriving existence from him.
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| 40. QUOD VERISSIME ILLE SIT PARENS ET ILLUD PROLES.
| 40. The Supreme Spirit is most truly parent, and the Word is most truly offspring.
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| Quodsi convenientissime dicitur nasci, et tam simile est illi de quo nascitur: cur aestimetur simile quasi proles parenti, et non potius asseratur quia tanto verior est ille parens et istud proles, quanto magis et ille ad huius nativitatis perfectionem solus sufficit, et quod nascitur eius similitudinem exprimit? Namque in rebus aliis quas parentis prolisque certum est habitudinem habere, nulla sic gignit, ut omnino nullius indigens sola per se ad gignendam prolem sufficiat; nulla sic gignitur, ut nulla admixta /58/ dissimilitudine omnimodam similitudinem parentis exhibeat.
| But if it is most properly said to be born, and is so like him of whom it is born, why should it be esteemed like, as a child is like his parent? why should it not rather be declared, that the Spirit is more truly a parent, and the Word his offspring, the more he alone is sufficient to effect this birth, and the more what is born expresses his likeness? For, among other beings which we know bear the relations of parent and child, none so begets as to be solely and without accessory, sufficient to the generation of offspring; and none is so begotten that without any admixture of unlikeness, it shows complete likeness to its parent.
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| Si ergo verbum summi spiritus sic est omnino ex ipsius sola essentia, et sic singulariter est illi simile, ut nulla proles sic sit omnino ex sola parentis essentia, aut sic similis parenti: profecto nullis rebus tam convenienter videtur aptari habitudo parentis et prolis, quam summo spiritui et verbo eius. Quapropter illius est proprium verissimum esse parentem, istius vero verissimam esse prolem.
| If, then, the Word of the supreme Spirit so derives its complete existence from the being of that Spirit himself alone, and is so uniquely like him, that no child ever so completely derives existence from its parent, and none is so like its parent, certainly the relation of parent and offspring can be ascribed to no beings so consistently as to the supreme Spirit and his Word. Hence, it is his property to be most truly parent, and its to be most truly his offspring.
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| 41. QUOD ILLE VERISSIME GIGNAT, ILLUD GIGNATUR.
| 41. The Supreme Spirit most truly begets, and the Word is most truly begotten.
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| At hoc constare non poterit, nisi pariter ille verissime gignat, et istud verissime gignatur. Sicut igitur illud est perspicuum, ita hoc esse certissimum necesse est. Quare summi spiritus est verissime gignere, et verbi eius verissime gigni.
| But it will be impossible to establish this proposition, unless, in equal degree, he most truly begets, and it is most truly begotten. As the former supposition is evidently true, so the latter is necessarily most certain. Hence, it belongs to the supreme Spirit most truly to beget, and to his Word to be most truly begotten.
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| 42. QUOD ALTERIUS VERISSIME SIT ESSE GENITOREM ET PATREM, ALTERIUS GENITUM ET FILIUM.
| 42. It is most truly characteristic of the one to be begetter and father, and of the other to be begotten and son.
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| Vellem iam quidem et forte possem illum esse verissime patrem, hoc vero esse verissime filium concludere; sed nec hoc negligendum existimo, an patris et filii, an matris et filiae magis illis apta sit appellatio, cum in eis nulla sit sexus discretio.
| I should certainly be glad, and perhaps able, now to reach the conclusion, that he is most truly the Father, while this Word is most truly his Son. But I think that even this question should not be neglected: whether it is more fitting to call them Father and Son, than mother and daughter, since in them there is no distinction of sex.
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| Nam si idcirco convenienter est ille pater et proles eius filius, quia uterque est spiritus: cur non pari ratione alteri convenit esse matrem, alteri filiam, quia uterque est veritas et sapientia?
| For, if it is consistent with the nature of the one to be the Father, and of his offspring to be the Son, because both are Spirit (Spiritus, masculine); why is it not, with equal reason, consistent with the nature of the one to be the mother, and the other the daughter, since both are truth and wisdom (veritas et sapientia, feminine)?
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| An quia in iis naturis quae sexus habent differentiam, melioris sexus est patrem esse vel filium, minoris vero matrem vel filiam? Est hoc quidem naturaliter in pluribus; in quibusdam vero e contrario, ut in quibusdam avium generibus, in quibus femininus sexus semper maior et validior est, masculinus vero minor et infirmior. /59/
| Or, is it because in these natures that have a difference of sex, it belongs to the superior sex to be father or son, and to the inferior to be mother or daughter? And this is certainly a natural fact in most instances, but in some the contrary is true, as among certain kinds of birds, among which the female is always larger and stronger, while the male is smaller and weaker.
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| Aut certe idcirco magis convenit summo spiritui patrem dici quam matrem, quia prima et principalis causa prolis semper est in patre. Nam si maternam causam quolibet modo semper paterna praecedit, nimis incongruum est, ut illi parenti aptetur nomen matris, cui ad gignendam prolem nulla alia causa aut sociatur aut praecedit. Verissimum igitur est summum spiritum patrem esse prolis suae. Quod si filius semper similior est patri quam filia, nihil autem similius est alteri quam summo patri proles sua: verissimum est hanc prolem non esse filiam sed filium.
| At any rate, it is more consistent to call the supreme Spirit father than mother, for this reason, that the first and principal cause of offspring is always in the father. For, if the maternal cause is ever in some way preceded by the paternal, it is exceedingly inconsistent that the name mother should be attached to that parent with which, for the generation of offspring, no other cause is associated, and which no other precedes. It is, therefore, most true that the supreme Spirit is Father of his offspring. But, if the son is always more like the father than is the daughter, while nothing is more like the supreme Father than his offspring; then it is most true that this offspring is not a daughter, but a Son.
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| Sicut igitur proprium est illius verissime gignere, istius vero gigni: sic proprium est illius verissimum esse genitorem, istius vero verissimum genitum. Et sicut alter est verissimus parens, alter verissima proles: sic alter est verissimus pater, alter verissimus filius.
| Hence, just as it is the property of the one most truly to beget, and of the other to be begotten, so it is the property of the one to be most truly progenitor, and of the other to be most truly begotten. And as the one is most truly the parent, and the other his offspring, so the one is most truly Father, and the other most truly Son.
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| 43. RETRACTATIO COMMUNIONIS AMBORUM ET PROPRIETATUM SINGULORUM.
| 43. Reconsideration of what is common to both and of what is proper to each.
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| Inventis tot et tantis singulorum proprietatibus, quibus mira quaedam tam ineffabilis quam inevitabilis in summa unitate probatur esse pluralitas: valde mihi videtur delectabile retractare saepius tam impenetrabile secretum.
| Now that so many and so important properties of each have been discovered, whereby a strange plurality, as ineffable as it is inevitable, is proved to exist in the supreme unity, I think it most interesting to reflect, again and again, upon so unfathomable a mystery.
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| Ecce enim, cum sic impossibile sit eundem esse eum qui gignit et eum qui gignitur, atque eundem esse parentem et prolem, ut necesse sit alium esse genitorem, alium genitum, et alium esse patrem, alium filium: sic tamen necesse est idem esse illum qui gignit et illum qui gignitur, necnon parentem et prolem, ut impossibile sit aliud esse genitorem quam quod est genitus, aliud esse patrem quam quod filius.
| For observe: although it is so impossible that he who begets, and he who is begotten, are the same, and that parent and offspring are the same—so impossible that necessarily one must be the progenitor and the other the begotten, and one the Father, the other the Son; yet, here it is so necessary that he who begets and he who is begotten shall be the same, and also that parent and offspring shall be the same, that the progenitor cannot be any other than what the begotten is, nor the Father any other than the Son.
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| Et cum ita sit alius ille et alius ille, ut omnino pateat quod duo sint: sic tamen unum et idipsum est id quod est ille et ille, ut penitus lateat quid duo sint. Nam sic est alius pater, alius filius, ut cum ambos dixerim, videam me duos dixisse; et sic est idipsum, quod est et pater et filius, ut non intelligam quid duos dixerim.
| And although the one is one, and the other another, so that it is altogether evident that they are two; yet that which the one and the other are is in such a way one and the same, that it is a most obscure mystery why they are two. For, in such a way is one the Father and the other the Son, that when I speak of both I perceive that I have spoken of two; and yet so identical is that which both Father and Son are, that I do not understand why they are two of whom I have spoken.
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| Quamvis namque singulus pater sit perfecte summus spiritus et singulus filius sit perfecte summus spiritus: sic tamen unum idemque est spiritus pater et spiritus filius, ut pater et filius non sint duo spiritus sed unus spiritus. Ut sicut singula propria singulorum non recipiunt pluralitatem quia non sunt duorum, ita id quod /60/ commune est amborum, individuam teneat unitatem, quamvis totum sit singulorum.
| For, although the Father separately is the perfectly supreme Spirit, and the Son separately is the perfectly supreme Spirit, yet, so are the Spirit-Father and the Spirit-Son one and the same being, that the Father and the Son are not two spirits, but one Spirit. For, just as to separate properties of separate beings, plurality is not attributed, since they are not properties of two things, so, what is common to both preserves an indivisible unity, although it belongs, as a whole, to them taken separately.
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| Nam sicut non sunt duo patres aut duo filii sed unus pater et unus filius, quondam singula sunt singulorum propria: ita non sunt duo sed unus spiritus, quamvis et singuli patris et singuli filii sit perfectum esse spiritum. Sic sunt oppositi relationibus, ut alter numquam suscipiat proprium alterius; sic sunt concordes natura, ut alter semper teneat essentiam alterius. Sic enim diversi sunt per hoc quod alter est pater, alter filius, ut numquam dicatur aut pater filius aut filius pater; et sic idem sunt per substantiam, ut semper sit in patre essentia filii et in filio essentia patris. Est enim non diversa sed eadem, non plures sed una utriusque essentia.
| For, as there are not two fathers or two sons, but one Father and one Son, since separate properties belong to separate beings, so there are not two spirits, but one Spirit; although it belongs both to the Father, taken separately, and to the Son, taken separately, to be the perfect Spirit. For so opposite are their relations, that the one never assumes the property of the other; so harmonious are they in nature, that the one ever contains the essence of the other. For they are so diverse by virtue of the fact that the one is the Father and the other the Son, that the Father is never called the Son, nor the Son the Father; and they are so identical, by virtue of their substance, that the essence of the Son is ever in the Father, and the essence of the Father in the Son.
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| 44. QUOMODO ALTER ALTERIUS SIT ESSENTIA.
| 44. How the one is the essence of the other.
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| Unde etiam, si alter alterius dicatur essentia, non erratur a veritate sed summa unites simplicitasque commendatur communis naturae. Non enim quemadmodum intelligitur sapientia hominis, per quam homo sapiens est, qui per se non potest esse sapiens, ita intelligi potest, si dicatur pater essentia filii et filius essentia patris, ut eo modo sit filius existens per patrem et pater per filium, quasi non possit alter existens esse nisi per alterum, sicut homo non potest esse sapiens nisi per sapientiam.
| Hence, even if one is called the essence of the other, there is no departure from truth; but the supreme simplicity and unity of their common nature is thus honored. For, not as one conceives of a man’s wisdom, through which man is wise, though he cannot be wise through himself, can we thus understand the statement that the Father is essence of the Son, and the Son the essence of the Father. We cannot understand that the Son is existent through the Father, and the Father through the Son, as if the one could not be existent except through the other, just as a man cannot be wise except through wisdom.
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| Sicut namque summa sapientia semper sapit per se, ita summa essentia semper est per se. Est autem perfecte summa essentia pater et perfecte summa essentia filius. Pariter ergo perfectus pater per se est et perfectus filius per se est, sicut uterque sapit per se.
| For, as the supreme Wisdom is ever wise through itself, so the supreme Essence ever exists through itself. But, the perfectly supreme Essence is the Father, and the perfectly supreme Essence is the Son. Hence, the perfect Father and the perfect Son exist, each through himself, just as each is wise through himself.
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| Non enim idcirco minus perfecta est essentia vel sapientia filius, quia est essentia nata de patris essentia et sapientia de sapientia; sed tunc minus perfecta essentia aut sapientia esset, si non esset per se aut non saperet per se.
| For the Son is not the less perfect essence or wisdom because he is an essence born of the essence of the Father, and a wisdom born of the wisdom of the Father; but he would be a less perfect essence or wisdom if he did not exist through himself, and were not wise through himself.
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| Nequaquam enim repugnant, ut filius /61/ et per se subsistat et de patre habeas esse. "Sicut enim pater habet" essentiam et sapientiam et "uitam in semetipso", ut non per alienam sed per suam essentiam sit, per suam sapientiam sapiat, per suam vitam vivat: "ita" gignendo "dat filio habere" essentiam et sapientiam et "uitam in semetipso", ut non per extraneam sed per suam essentiam, sapientiam et vitam subsistat, sapiat et vivat. Alioquin non erit idem esse patris et filii, nec erit par patri filius. Quod quam falsum sit, liquidissime superius peruisum est.
| For, there is no inconsistency between the subsistence of the Son through himself, and his deriving existence from his Father. For, as the Father has essence, and wisdom, and life in himself; so that not through another’s, but through his own, essence he exists; through his own wisdom he is wise; through his own life he lives; so, by generation, he grants to his Son the possession of essence, and wisdom, and life in himself, so that not through an extraneous essence, wisdom, and life, but through his own, he subsists, is wise, and lives; otherwise, the existence of Father and Son will not be the same, nor will the Son be equal to the Father. But it has already been clearly proved how false this supposition is.
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| Quare non repugnat filium et subsistere per se et esse de patre, quia hoc ipsum, id est per seipsum posse subsistere, necesse est ilium habere ex patre. Nam si quis sapiens suam me sapientiam cuius prius expers essem doceret: utique hoc ipsa sapientia eius facere non incongrue diceretur. Sed quamvis mea sapientia ab illius sapientia haberet esse et sapere, tamen cum iam esset, non nisi sua essentia esset nec saperet nisi seipsa.
| Hence, there is no inconsistency between the subsistence of the Son through himself, and his deriving existence from the Father, since he must have from the Father this very power of subsisting through himself. For, if a wise man should teach me his wisdom, which I formerly lacked, he might without impropriety be said to teach me by this very wisdom of his. But, although my wisdom would derive its existence and the fact of its being from his wisdom, yet when my wisdom once existed, it would be no other essence than its own, nor would it be wise except through itself.
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| Multo igitur magis aeterni patris coaeternus filius, qui sic habet a patre esse ut non sint duae essentiae, per se subsistit, sapit et vivit. Non igitur sic intelligi potest quod pater filii aut filius patris sit essentia, quasi alter non possit subsistere per se sed per alterum; sed ad significandam quam habent communionem summe simplicis summeque unius essentiae, sic congrue dici et intelligi potest quia sic est alter idipsum quod alter, ut alter habeas essentiam alterius.
| Much more, then, the eternal Father’s eternal Son, who so derives existence from the Father that they are not two essences, subsists, is wise, and lives through himself. Hence, it is inconceivable that the Father should be the essence of the Son, or the Son the essence of the Father, on the ground that the one could not subsist through itself, but must subsist through the other. But in order to indicate how they share in an essence supremely simple and supremely one, it may consistently be said, and conceived, that the one is so identical with the other that the one possesses the essence of the other.
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| Hac itaque ratione, quondam utrique non aliud est habere essentiam quam essentiam esse: sicut habet alter alterius essentiam, ita est alter essentia alterius; id est idem esse est alteri quod alteri.
| On these grounds, then, since there is obviously no difference between possessing an essence and being an essence, just as the one possesses the essence of the other, so the one is the essence of the other, that is, the one has the same existence with the other.
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| 45. QUOD APTIUS DICI POSSIT FILIUS ESSENTIA PATRIS QUAM PATER FILII; ET QUOD SIMILITER SIT FILIUS PATRIS VIRTUE ET SAPIENTIA ET SIMILIA.
| 45. The Son can more fittingly be called the essence of the Father than the Father [can be called the essence] of the Son. Similarly, the Son is the strength of the Father, the wisdom of the Father, and the like.
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| Quod licet secundum perspectam rationem verum sit, valde tamen magis congruit filium dici essentiam patris quam patrem essentiam filii. Quoniam namque pater a nullo habet essentiam nisi a seipso, non satis /62/ apte dicitur habere essentiam alicuius nisi suam. Quia vero filius essentiam suam habet a patre, et eandem quam habet pater: aptissime dici potest habere essentiam patris.
| And although, for reasons we have noted, this is true, it is much more proper to call the Son the essence of the Father than the Father the essence of the Son. For, since the Father has his being from none other than himself, it is not wholly appropriate to say that he has the being of another than himself; while, since the Son has his being from the Father, and has the same essence with his Father, he may most appropriately be said to have the essence of his Father.
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| Quare quoniam neuter aliter habet essentiam quam existendo essentia: sicut satis aptius intelligitur habere filius patris essentiam quam pater filii, ita convenientius dici potest filius patris essentia quam pater filii. Nam haec una si fiat prolatio, satis acuta brevitate commendat filium non solum eandem essentiam habere cum patre sed hanc ipsam habere de patre. Ut hoc sit: filius est essentia patris, quod est: filius est non differens essentia de patris essentia, immo de patre essentia. Similiter ergo est filius patris virtus et sapientia seu veritas, et iustitia et quidquid summi spiritus convenit essentiae.
| Hence, seeing that neither has an essence, except by being an essence; as the Son is more appropriately conceived to have the essence of the Father than the Father to have the essence of the Son, so the Son may more fitly be called the essence of the Father than the Father the essence of the son. For this single explanation proves, with sufficiently emphatic brevity, that the Son not only has the same essence with the Father, but has this very essence from the Father; so that, to assert that the Son is the essence of the Father is the same as to assert that the Son is not a different essence from the essence of the Father—nay, from the Father essence. In like manner, therefore, the Son is the virtue of the Father, and his wisdom, and justice, and whatever is consistently attributed to the essence of the supreme Spirit.
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| 46. QUOMODO QUAEDAM EX IIS QUAE SIC PROFERUNTUR, ALITER QUOQUE POSSINT INTELLIGI.
| 46. How various of the [statements] which are expressed in the foregoing way can also be understood in another way.
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| Videntur tamen quaedam ex iis quae sic proferri et intelligi possunt, aliam quoque non incongruam sub hac ipsa pronuntiatione intelligentiam suscipere. Liquet enim filium esse verum verbum, id est perfectam intelligentiam sive perfectam totius paternae substantiae cognitianem et scientiam et sapientiam, id est quae ipsam patris essentiam intelligit et cognoscit et scit et sapit.
| Yet, some of these truths, which may be thus expounded and conceived of, are apparently capable of another interpretation as well, not inconsistent with this same assertion. For it is proved that the Son is the true Word, that is, the perfect intelligence, conceiving of the whole substance of the Father, or perfect cognition of that substance, and knowledge of it, and wisdom regarding it; that is, it understands, and conceives of, the very essence of the Father, and cognises it, and knows it, and is wise (sapit) regarding it.
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| Si igitur hoc sensu filius dicatur patris intelligentia et sapientia et scientia et cognitio sive notitia, quoniam intelligit, sapit, scit et novit patrem: nequaquam a veritate disceditur.
| If, then, in this sense, the Son is called the intelligence of the Father, and wisdom concerning him, and knowledge and cognition of him, and acquaintance with him; since the Son understands and conceives of the Father, is wise concerning him, knows and is acquainted with him, there is no departure from truth.
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| Veritas quoque patris aptissime dici potest filius, non solum eo sensu quia est eadem filii veritas quae est et patris, sicut iam perspectum est; sed etiam hoc sensu, ut in eo intelligatur non imperfecta quaedam imitatio sed integra veritas paternae substantiae, quia non est aliud quam quod est pater. /63/
| Most properly, too, may the Son be called the truth of the Father, not only in the sense that the truth of the Son is the same with that of the Father, as we have already seen; but in this sense, also, that in him no imperfect imitation shall be conceived of, but the complete truth of the substance of the Father since he is no other than what the Father is.
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| 47. QUOD FILIUS SIT INTELLIGENTIA INTELLIGENTIAE ET VERITAS VERITATIS ET SIMILITER DE SIMILIBUS.
| 47. The Son is Understanding of Understanding, Truth of Truth, etc.
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| At si ipsa substantia patris est intelligentia et scientia et sapientia et veritas, consequenter colligitur quia sicut filius est intelligentia et scientia et sapientia et veritas paternae substantiae, ita est intelligentia intelligentiae, scientia scientiae, sapientia sapientiae, veritas veritatis.
| But if the very substance of the Father is intelligence, and knowledge, and wisdom, and truth, it is consequently inferred that as the Son is the intelligence, and knowledge, and wisdom, and truth, of the paternal substance, so he is the intelligence of intelligence, the knowledge of knowledge, the wisdom of wisdom, and the truth of truth.
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| 48. QUOD IN MEMORIA INTELLIGATUR PATER, SICUT IN INTELLIGENTIA FILIUS; ET QUOMODO FILIUS SIT INTELLIGENTIA VEL SAPIENTIA MEMORIAE ET MEMORIA PATRIS ET MEMORIAE.
| 48. The Father is referred to as Memory, just as the Son is referred to as Understanding. How the Son is the Understanding (or Wisdom) of Memory, the Memory of the Father, and the Memory of Memory.
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| De memoria vero quid sentiendum est? An aestimandus est filius intelligentia memoriae, sive memoria patris, aut memoria memoriae? Equidem cum summa sapientia sui memor esse negari non possit: nihil competentius quam in memoria pater sicut in verbo filius intelligitur, quoniam de memoria nasci verbum videtur. Quod clarius in nostra mente percipitur.
| But what is to be our notion of memory? Is the Son to be regarded as the intelligence conceiving of memory, or as the memory of the Father, or as the memory of memory? Indeed, since it cannot be denied that the supreme Wisdom remembers itself, nothing can be more consistent than to regard the Father as memory, just as the Son is the Word; because the Word is apparently born of memory, a fact that is more clearly seen in the case of the human mind.
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| Quoniam namque mens humana non semper se cogitat, sicut sui semper meminit: liquet cum se cogitat quia verbum eius nascitur de memoria. Unde apparet quia, si semper se cogitaret, semper verbum eius de memoria nasceretur. Rem etenim cogitare cuius memoriam habemus, hoc est mente eam dicere; verbum vero rei est ipsa cogitatio ad eius similitudinem ex memoria formata.
| For, since the human mind is not always thinking of itself, though it ever remembers itself, it is clear that, when it thinks of itself, the word corresponding to it is born of memory. Hence, it appears that, if it always thought of itself, its word would be always born of memory. For, to think of an object of which we have remembrance, this is to express it mentally; while the word corresponding to the object is the thought itself, formed after the likeness of that object from memory.
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| Hinc itaque liquido animadverti potest de summa sapientia, quae sic semper se dicit sicut semper sui memor est, quia de eeterna memoria eius coaeternum verbum nascitur. Sicut igitur verbum congrue intelligitur proles, ita memoria parentis nomen aptissime /64/ suscipit. Si ergo proles, quae omnino de solo summo spiritu nata est, proles est memoriae eius: nihil consequentius quam quia memoria sua est idem ipse. Quippe non in eo quod sui memor est, sic est in sua memoria velut alia res in alia, quemadmodum ea quae sic sunt in humanae mentis memoria, ut non sint ipsa nostra memoria; sed sic est memor sui, ut ipse memoria sua sit.
| Hence, it may be clearly apprehended in the supreme Wisdom, which always thinks of itself, just as it remembers itself, that, of the eternal remembrance of it, its coeternal Word is born. Therefore, as the Word is properly conceived of as the child, the memory most appropriately takes the name of parent. If, then, the child which is born of the supreme Spirit alone is the child of his memory, there can be no more logical conclusion than that his memory is himself. For not in respect of the fact that he remembers himself does he exist in his own memory, like ideas that exist in the human memory, without being the memory itself; but he so remembers himself that he is his own memory.
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| Consequitur itaque ut, quomodo filius est intelligentia sive sapientia patris, ita sit et paternae memoriae. At quidquid filius sapit aut intelligit, eius similiter et meminit. Est igitur filius memoria patris et memoria memoriae, id est memoria memor patris qui est memoria, sicut est sapientia patris et sapientia sapientiae, id est sapientia sapiens patrem sapientiam. Et filius quidem memoria nata de memoria, sicut sapientia nata de sapientia; pater vero de nullo nata memoria vel sapientia.
| It therefore follows that, just as the Son is the intelligence or wisdom of the Father, so he is that of the memory of the Father. But, regarding whatever the Son has wisdom or understanding, this he likewise remembers. The Son is, therefore, the memory of the Father, and the memory of memory, that is, the memory that remembers the Father, who is memory, just as he is the wisdom of the Father, and the wisdom of wisdom, that is, the wisdom wise regarding the wisdom of the Father; and the Son is indeed memory, born of memory, as he is wisdom, born of wisdom, while the Father is memory and wisdom born of none.
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